The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left?
Husain has given some excellent insights regarding the rivalry between different Islamic groups, the importance of formation of “halqas” or cells, and the processes of socialisation and communications inside the cells where the radical values were internalised among the young students.
Halqas are very much similar to very disciplined and secretive cells built by leftist guerrilla fighting groups. In modern times this tradition can be traced back to secretive cells associated with Social Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks in Russia’s late 19th and early 20th centuries. Similar methods were used by many urban guerrilla fighters in Latin America and other countries like Iran.
In the United Kingdom (UK), Husain shows that most of the students who joined these radical Islamists stepped out of family traditions and followed a different direction from dominant and community-based structures. The students acted like free individuals in joining their favourite competing groups in the UK. These young student who were educated and active in debates had many other choices in life. Many of them had experienced discos, dancing, club life and Western music and had even been members of other radical and secular groups.
The evidence supports Bauman’s arguments related to “liquid modernity” in which formation of identity by free individuals fighting for recognition of their identity has become essential (Bauman, 2000).
The radical groups are generated in a very dynamic condition involving mechanisms of self-perpetuation, this process also generates their culture of enclosures in which mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion define the order necessary for their identity claims. Conflicts, drawing and redrawing of the boundaries, occupying and reoccupying the space and symbolic importance of presentation and using media are some essential characteristics of these groups.
Determination, occupation of space and filling all gaps by variety of activities, exploiting emotional characteristics and internalising them by a sense of pride ;and rewarding them in terms of responsibilities and promotion to higher ranks in hierarchy are parts of the whole process of socialisation which also involves peer pressure.
“Them” and “us” were developed to include all Muslims in general “us” and “them” all other peoples, particularly Westerners. At the group level the term “us” only recognises the group itself and excludes other similar Islamic groups.
Using high tech to Islamise Britain is an ideal objective these groups follow. They are aware of the UK’s importance as an international meeting point for radicals to learn new methods; and they return to their countries with a global view of communication and sense of solidarity and unity with other Muslims.
The groups socialised the members in a way to regard all non-Muslims as inferior and even ordinary Muslims as inferior to members of political groups.
They are highly politicised and attempt to put politics and power above any traditional definition of religious obligation. From this point of view there is a kind of mean end replacement. Husain states that “prayers were linked to political ambitions” (p. 146) and participation in prayers was seen as an act of practising leadership and “prayers were not the first priority”, (p. 147), “establishing the Islamic state was more important than minor matters such as praying, reciting the Koran, giving to charity, or being kind to our parents and fellow Muslims” (p. 148).
Husain’s book is certainly a very useful contribution to our understanding of Islamist political movements in the UK. The ideas and internal dynamics of various radical Islamist groups, in the UK, described and discussed in this book provides social scientists particularly in sociology and politics with some original evidence.
However, the book has some weaknesses as well and I would like to highlight a few of them. Husain has bravely moved towards a more relativistic approach criticizing others’ views as tyrannical, absolutist and sectarian which exclude all non-compliant views. Husain rejects those views for being wrong in the understanding of “true Islam”. While he has rejected the sectarian and politicized interpretations of Islam he has regarded his own perspective as true Islam. Then, what is true Islam? And who is a true Muslim?
His answers to these questions do not seem convincing because the arguments are based on considering Islam as a timeless phenomenon in which historical interpretations are irrelevant. This method can open a comfortable place for a denial approach arguing that those who act with sectarian views and use political Islam as their programme are not true Muslims. The analytical dimension of such an argument is weak and does not help us to understand the contemporary phenomena that has emerged in Islam.
Husain has not been very careful in using the concept of Ulema which has been applied to those who argued for reinforcement of Islamic Jurispredection or sharia’ law. Ulema represented Shria competing with the schools of “tariqa” or sofism. Husain argues that “Countless generations of Muslim men have failed to grasp the prophets’ spirit of progress, social change, and respect for humanity” (p. 246). In idealising Islam and Mohammad, Husain has borrowed modernist phrases but without providing enough support and without considering inconsistencies they may create with the idea of “true Islam” as a timeless concept.
Husain also has not been careful in his criticism of many social scientists such as Roseau, Hegel, Niche, Marx, and Gramsci (pp.163-164). He has neither recognised the strengths of these prominent social scientists and philosophers, nor the contributions they have made to our modern understanding of society and politics (p. 77).
Reference
Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid Modernity. Cambridg: Polity.
